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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRENDA F. ELLINGSWORTH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970456-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant•] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides 
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported 
by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer 
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and 
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only 
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (1994) provided: 
§ 35-1-109. Workers' compensation insurance fraud --
Elements -- Penalties -- Notice. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(1). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in 
Subsection 76-2-103(3). 
(2) Any person who has intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly, devised any scheme or artifice to obtain 
workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability 
compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional 
services, fees for professional services, or anything of 
value under this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly communicates or 
causes a communication with another in furtherance of the 
scheme or artifice, is guilty of workers' compensation 
insurance fraud, which is punishable in the manner 
prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the 
offense of workers' compensation insurance fraud under 
the same conditions as those set forth in Section 
76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense 
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value 
of all property, money, or other things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described 
in Subsection (1) , except as provided in Subsection 
76-10-1801(1) (e) . 
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a 
necessary element of the offense described in Subsection 
(1) . 
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(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any 
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently 
deprive any person of property, money, or anything of 
value is not a necessary element of this offense. 
(7) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance coverage includes any scheme or 
artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or 
oral statement or business reorganization, incorporation, 
or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance 
coverage as mandated by this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do not reflect 
the risk, industry, employer, or class codes actually 
covered by the policy. 
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability 
compensation includes a scheme or artifice to collect or 
make a claim for temporary disability compensation as 
provided in Section 35-1-65 while working for gain. 
(9) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in 
connection with this chapter or Chapter 2, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or 
furnishes a form to any person upon which that person 
applies for insurance coverage, reports payroll, makes a 
claim by reason of accident, injury, death, disease, or 
other claimed loss, or otherwise reports or gives notice 
to the insurer or self-insured employer, shall cause to 
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence with 
other content the statement: "Any person who knowingly 
presents false or fraudulent underwriting information, 
files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim 
for disability compensation or medical benefits, or 
submits a false or fraudulent report or billing for 
health care fees or other professional services is guilty 
of a crime and may be subject to fines and confinement in 
state prison." This statement shall be preceded by the 
words: "For your protection, Utah law requires the 
following to appear on this form: or other explanatory 
words of similar meaning. 
(10) Each insurer or self-insured employer who 
issues a check, warrant, or other financial instrument in 
payment of compensation issued under this chapter or 
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to 
be printed or displayed in comparative prominence above 
the area for endorsement the statement: "Workers' 
compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by 
Utah law." 
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, 
insurer, or governmental entity that reports a suspected 
fraudulent act relating to a workers' compensation 
insurance policy or claim is not subject to any civil 
liability for libel, slander, or any other relevant cause 
of action. 
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(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, 
this section supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance 
Fraud Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress medical records and derivative evidence obtained pursuant 
to a written consent expressly limiting the use of those records to 
"the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers compensation 
benefits." 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991); Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a) (1990). However, in reviewing the 
court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215. 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992) . "In 
regard to consent to search, the trial court is granted only 
limited discretion in its application of the legal standard of 
consent to the facts." State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand 
Eight Hundred Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997). 
Preserved below by motion to suppress. R. 113-4 
(motion), 213:20-50 (transcript of evidence, argument, and bench 
ruling). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to ask the defendant to comment on the credibility of 
State witnesses? 
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Standard of Review. In assessing the prosecutor's 
questions and argument, this court will make an original 
determination of whether the prosecutor brought improper 
information to the jury's attention, and whether such information 
probably influenced the jurors. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984) . 
The improper questioning occurred at R. 215:564 and 
215:568. This issue is preserved by defense counsel's objection at 
R. 215:568-569; see also R. 213:154 (prior objection, stating "a 
witness cannot give an opinion as to the truthfulness or not 
truthfulness of a certain statement.").1 
3. Whether the trial committed plain error in allowing 
the prosecutor to misrepresent the evidence on multiple occasions? 
Standard of review. 
In general, to establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged 
error that was not properly objected to, the appellant 
must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence 
in the verdict is undermined. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-9 (Utah 1993). 
Not preserved below; addressed here for plain error. 
xEven if the objection made is held not to preserve the issue 
with regard to the first improper question, such questioning still 
constitutes plain error. State v. Palmer, 860 P. 2d 339, 342 (Utah 
App.) (finding it was plain error to allow prosecutor to ask 
defendant to comment on credibility of other witnesses) , cert. 
denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Brenda F. Ellingsworth was charged by 
information dated July 25, 1995 with two counts of Workers' 
Compensation Fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109 (Supp. 
1994), a 2nd degree felony and class B misdemeanor, for actions 
occurring between October 12, 1994 and January 25, 1995. R. 2-6 
(information), 7-10 (probable cause affidavit). On the State's 
motion, the class B misdemeanor count was dismissed. Ms. 
Ellingsworth was bound over on an amended count of third degree 
felony Workers' Compensation fraud. R. 54-5, 75-79 (amended 
information [3rd degree felony and class B misdemeanor]), 89-92 
(second amended information [single 3rd degree felony count]), 100-
102 (memorandum of law explaining reduction). 
Ms. Ellingsworth filed a pretrial motion to suppress 
medical reports obtained pursuant to a consent form and derivative 
testimony based on those reports, which was denied. R. 113-4 
("Motion to Suppress Evidence Illegally Obtained11); 213:20-50 
(transcript of evidence and argument, bench denial). 
Ms. Ellingsworth was convicted at trial. R. 213-215 (3 
volumes of transcripts), 193 (verdict), 196-7 (Judgment, Sentence 
(Commitment)). Ms. Ellingsworth's sentence was stayed pending 
satisfactory completion of probation, R. 196-7, and tfiis appeal 
ensued. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the motion to suppress, Ms. Paola Valente was called 
as a witness. She testified that she has worked four years as an 
adjuster at the Worker's Compensation Fund at 392 East 6400 South 
in Murray, Utah. R. 213:21. Ms. Valente was the adjuster assigned 
to Ms. Ellingsworth's October 12, 1994 claim for benefits. R. 
213:22. On January 11, 1995, Ms. Valente met with Ms. Ellingsworth 
to get an authorization to obtain medical records. R. 213:22-3. 
A copy of this authorization, introduced at trial as Exhibit S18-A, 
is attached as addendum A. 
Ms. Valente "explained to her that we needed to gather 
her prior medical records, gave her as much time as she needed, 
indicated to her that I needed her to list any and all doctors, 
hospitals, clinics, or physicians that she has seen in the last ten 
years." R. 213:24. "I explained to her that we needed to go ahead 
and collect her prior medicals as part of the investigation [i]nto 
her claim and that it was part of the investigation and she was 
required to cooperate." R. 213:24-5. 
Ms. Ellingsworth signed the release in Ms. Valente's 
presence. R. 213:26. The release provides, "This information will 
be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers 
compensation benefits." R. 213:31; see also addendum A. Ms. 
Valente did not indicate to Ms. Ellingsworth that information 
received would be used for criminal investigation of her. R. 
213:32. Pursuant to the consent form, medical records were sought 
from all local hospitals. R. 213:28-9. 
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The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the 
basis that the Workers' Compensation Fund is not a state agency. 
R. 213:50. Medical records and derivative evidence that should 
have been suppressed were admitted throughout the trial. 
During trial, the trial court twice allowed the 
prosecutor to ask Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of 
State witnesses: 
Q. Okay. Well she testified -- this is my 
recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight that 
they deem it deserves. She said that this had never 
happened before. Is it your testimony that she lied or 
misled the court? 
A. I don't believe she used those specific words. 
She said, "By pulling on a blind cord, " to the best of my 
knowledge. That's all I believe she said. 
R. 564 (emphasis added). 
Q. Did you hear him [Dr. Seeman] testify 
repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this 
case was convened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He isn't lying? 
A. I don't believe --
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection. She can't 
comment on the credibility of another witness. 
MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about what's going 
on here. Her testimony is one way someone else is --
pardon me. She is saying she lied under oath, is what 
she is saying. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Don't answer that., Miss Ellingsworth. 
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she can say that 
she's saying something different, but she can't say, 
"Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be inadvertent on Dr. 
Seeman's part. I think it is inappropriate for one 
witness to comment on the credibility of another. 
THE COURT: I think that's what the whole trial is 
about. 
She can answer. 
MR. GARDNER: Do you need me to repeat that 
question? 
A. No, I understood. 
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But 
towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having health problems 
8 
and he had had strokes and stuff and he wasn't keeping 
track of things in the office like he should have been. 
So he could have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying 
he was lying. 
R. 215:568-9 (emphasis added). 
On several occasions, the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by introducing unsupported innuendo and mischaracterizing prior 
evidence. In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated: 
And she was treated by a medical doctor there. And she 
claimed [sic:complained] of back pain to both the police 
officer -- and you are going to hear Steve Anjewierden 
from the Sheriff's Office testify. He was the officer on 
the case. He made a report. He'll testify that she told 
him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured in the 
face and jaw and the upper back. She told the ambulance 
driver, Cal Kunz -- he was with Gold Cross Ambulance 
Service, the same thing. 
R. 213:125-6 (emphasis added) . In fact, only Cal Kunz was told of 
back pain. See R. 213:189-204 (entire testimony of Anjewierden), 
especially at 201-2 (Ms. Ellingsworth did not tell the officer she 
was thrown against a wall, officer doesn't recall being told of 
back injury, nothing in report indicating back injury). 
In cross-examining Ms. Ellingsworth, the prosecutor 
asked: 
Q. Okay. You also testified that you told Paola 
Valente, when you talked to her by phone on October 17th, 
about the domestic violence assault that happened three 
days earlier; is that your testimony? 
A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying those 
specific words. 
Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you told 
Paola Valente all the information she asked you for? 
A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come our and 
say, "Has your -- does your husband beat you?" That's 
not something -- you know, "Had you been assaulted?", you 
know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no. 
Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone 
on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about the fact 
that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you? 
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A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't 
the same area that I hurt at work. 
Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you 
testify that you told Paola Valente about this assault. 
Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change? 
A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't know. 
R. 215:570-2 (emphasis added). In fact, her prior testimony had 
been that she provided Ms. Valente with everything she asked for, 
R. 215:549-50, and that she did not mention to Ms. Valente or Mr. 
Mann that she had been assaulted because it was to a different area 
than was injured at work, R. 215:559-60. 
Later, examination included: 
Q. You were telling him as truthfully as you 
could? 
A. Yes. But I was also heavily medicated at that 
time. 
Q. But you knew you had just come out of the 
hospital; didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Because he testified he asked you if you'd been 
hospitalized recently, and you said, "No." 
A. He knew. 
Q. Did you remember that at all? 
A. He knew that I had been in a hospital. I had 
talked to Paula Valente from the hospital. 
Q. But Brett Mann was the one talking to you then? 
A. I assumed he knew. 
Q. Do you remember him asking you if you had been 
hospitalized recently? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you remember telling him, no, you hadn't? 
A. No. 
Q. Any reason to believe this transcript and his 
testimony was inaccurate? 
A. I don't remember any of it. 
R. 215:583-4 (emphasis added). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
And on cross examination suddenly it is "Well, I just 
can't remember. I can't remember anything that happened 
to me because I had just gotten out of the hospital. And 
I asked, "Well, didn't he ask you if you had been in the 
hospital recently?" And you heard Brett Mann testify 
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that he asked that specific question, "Have you been in 
the hospital recently?" And the Defendant said, "No, " 
twice. She said, no, she had not been hospitalized 
recently. Well, today she said, "I got out of the 
hospital just one or two days before, and I had been in 
there for a month. " 
Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the 
hospital for a month to have some major work done on your 
stomach and you just get out of the hospital one or two 
days earlier and you are meeting with someone that says, 
"Have you been in the hospital?11, I suggest that each one 
of you would say, "Well, yes, I have. I just got out. 
I have been in for a month." But not the Defendant. She 
denied repeatedly that she had ever been in the hospital. 
And I suggest that that's part of the pattern that the 
Defendant was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation 
in the dark and keep the money coming and keep the 
medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming. 
R. 215:612-13 (emphasis added). 
In fact, Mr. Mann testified he asked her, "Have you been 
seen by a hospital other than your recent visit recently?" R. 
215:495 (emphasis added). "And you haven't been since the 
industrial injury to now? The only time you have been in the 
hospital is your recent stay?" R. 215:496 (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Ms. Ellingsworth's 
pretrial motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion on 
the basis that the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a 
state actor for purposes of the fourth amendment. To the contrary, 
the Workers' Compensation Fund is created by statute, has directors 
appointed by the Governor, and enjoys governmental immunity. As a 
quasi-public corporations, the Workers' Compensation Fund and its 
employees are governmental actors for purposes of fourth amendment 
analysis. 
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The consent form signed by Ms. Ellingsworth contained the 
express limitation, "This information will be used for the sole 
purpose of evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits." 
In contravention of this limitation, the State used the medical 
records it obtained pursuant to this release for the purpose of 
prosecuting Ms. Ellingsworth. This exceeded the scope of the 
limited consent granted, and violated the fourth amendment. 
Alternatively, the State has failed to establish that the 
consent was voluntary. At the time she signed the consent, Ms. 
Ellingsworth suffered under the misperception that the records 
would only be used to determine her eligibility to receive workers' 
compensation benefits. She was told she must cooperate. The 
inclusion of the limiting language in the consent, absent an 
intention to respect that language, constitutes deceit and trickery 
in the inducement. Under the totality of the circumstances, 
consent here cannot be said to be voluntary. The suppression 
motion denial should be reversed. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct in asking Ms. 
Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of other witnesses, and 
the trial court erred in allowing him to do so. State v. Palmer. 
This case hinged on Ms. Ellingsworth's credibility and whether the 
jury would accept her explanations for her apparent omissions. The 
prosecutor's questioning unfairly impugned her credibility to her 
prejudice. Her conviction should be reversed. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct in introducing 
unsupported innuendo and mischaracterizing prior evidence. In 
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closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury could convict based on 
purported evidence that does not exist. Ms. Ellingsworth was 
prejudiced. Individually and cumulatively, the errors here 
deprived Ms. Ellingsworth of a fair trial. This court should 
reverse. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUPPRESS MEDICAL RECORDS AND DERIVATIVE 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO MS. 
ELLINGSWORTH'S LIMITED CONSENT. 
A. WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND EMPLOYEES ARE 
STATE ACTORS FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
"The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures protects only against governmental actions 
and does not extend to the independent acts of private citizens." 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988) (citing United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 
L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476, 41 S.Ct. 
574, 576, 65 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1921)). Accord State v. Newbold, 581 
P. 2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972) ("The protection of the Fourth Amendment 
is a restraint only upon the activities of sovereign authority and 
is not applicable to the searches and seizures by any persons other 
than government officers and agents.") (plurality opinion). 
The fourth amendment applies to all State actors, not 
just law enforcement officers. 
The strictures of the Fourth Amendment, applied 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, have been 
applied to the conduct of governmental officials in 
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various civil activities. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 334-335, 105 S. Ct. 733, 738-739, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 
(1985) . Thus, we have held in the past that the Fourth 
Amendment governs the conduct of school officials, see 
ibid., building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 
930 (1967), and Occupational Safety and Health Act 
inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 
312-313, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820-1821, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 
As we observed in T.L.O., "[b]ecause the individual's 
interest in privacy and personal security 'suffers 
whether the government's motivation is to investigate 
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other 
statutory or regulatory standards,' . . . it would be 
'anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only 
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' 
11
 469 U.S., at 335, 105 S.Ct., at 739 (quoting Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S., at 312-313, 98 S.Ct., 
at 1820 and Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S., 
at 530, 87 S.Ct., at 1731). 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-5, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 94 
L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). 
On the motion to suppress, the trial court held: 
The motion's denied. I'm finding that the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is not a state agency 
and that Miss Ellingsworth knowingly and voluntarily 
signed a complete release with the understanding that a 
full investigation would be done in order to validate or 
invalidate her claim. 
You'll do findings and an order, Mr. Gardner, 
although they certainly don't need to be done until trial 
is over. 
R. 213:50. In ruling on a motion to suppress statements of the 
defendant, the trial court shed further light on its prior ruling: 
THE COURT: Okay. I will be pleased to read 
any case that you find that's pertinent to the issue, but 
-- and subject to reversing myself; but I'm going to go 
ahead and deny the motion; same basis as the last one, I 
don't think this is a state agency. I think this is 
essentially a private insurance company and what happened 
is no different than if it had happened with Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Utah. And, in fact, Miss 
Ellingsworth's actions were in her legitimate attempt to 
qualify for insurance benefits. She provided information 
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that was requested. I don't see how this could possibly 
be in the nature of a law enforcement interview. That's 
the reason for the ruling. 
R. 213:72-3 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the court's finding, Workers' Compensation 
Fund employees are State agents, working for a State agency, and 
are thus subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment. The 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah is statutorily created by 
Chapter 3 of Title 35, Utah Code Annotated.2 "There is created a 
nonprofit, quasi-public corporation to be known as the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-2(1) (a) (1994) .3 
The Board of Directors is appointed by the Governor, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-5 (1994).4 
Directors are removable for cause by the Governor. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-3-5(10) (1994) .5 Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-8 (1994)6 extends 
governmental immunity to good faith actions of officers and 
employees of the fund.7 Utah Code Ann. 35-3-18 (1994)8 exempts the 
2Now Chapter 33 of Title 31A. Code sections relating to 
workforce services were renumbered in both 1996 and 1997. See 
Tables of Corresponding Sections following Title 35A, Utah Code 
Ann. (1997) . Throughout this brief, appellant will refer to those 
sections in effect from October 1994 through January 1995, the time 
of the offense alleged here, and set forth the current codification 
in the margin. 
3Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-102 (Supp. 1997). 
4Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (Supp. 1997). 
5Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106(10) (Supp. 1997). 
6Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-109 (Supp. 1997). 
7The Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
(continued...) 
15 
Workers' Compensation Fund from certain specific statutes that 
apply generally to all governmental agencies (e.g., GRAMA, Utah 
Administrative Services Act, Administrative Procedures Act). 
The Workers' Compensation Fund is thus a creature of 
statute, with direct oversight by the Governor and a Board of 
Directors appointed by that Governor. Governmental immunity has 
been extended to good faith actions of its officers and employees, 
a protection wholly unavailable to private persons in the 
performance of their non-governmental employment duties. Likewise, 
the Workers' Compensation Fund has been exempted from some portions 
of otherwise applicable administrative statutory schemes. 
Quasi-public corporations and their employees are 
governmental actors for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. In 
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 
1997) , the First Circuit held that the Puerto Rico Telephone 
Company, as a quasi-public corporation, "is, therefore, a 
government actor [cites omitted] subject to the suasion of the 
Fourth Amendment." 110 F.3d at 178. The court proceeded to 
7(...continued) 
'The immunity from liability of quasi-public 
corporations is generally placed upon the ground of their 
involuntary and public character. They are usually 
treated as public or state agencies, and their duties are 
ordinarily wholly governmental. They exercise the 
greater part of their functions as agencies of the state 
merely, and are created for purposes of public policy, 
and hence the general rule that they are not responsible 
for the neglect of duties enjoined on them, unless the 
action is given by statute.' 
Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) 
(quoting McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 2775 (2nd Ed.). 
8Now Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-104 (Supp. 1997). 
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address the fourth amendment invasion of privacy claims made by the 
appellants on the merits. The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
stands on equal footing, and it and its employees are government 
actors for purposes of the fourth amendment. 
In reaching its erroneous ruling, the trial court seemed 
to rely on the distinction that the function of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund is akin to that of a private insurance company: 
I'm going to go ahead and deny the motion; same basis as 
the last one, I don't think this is a state agency. I 
think this is essentially a private insurance company and 
what happened is no different than if it had happened 
with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Utah. 
R. 213:72-3. The trial court's observation concerning the function 
performed by the Workers' Compensation Fund is irrelevant for 
purposes of fourth amendment analysis. The inquiry begins and ends 
with whether governmental action is implicated. Granted, the 
Workers' Compensation Fund essentially operates as an insurance 
company. But the mere fact that its function could be performed by 
a private actor, e.g. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, does not serve to 
change its status from that of a governmental actor to a private 
actor. 
Numerous functions in everyday life are performed by both 
government and private actors. Private parcel delivery services 
perform essentially the same task as the Postal Service. Despite 
this similarity in function, that the fourth amendment is 
applicable to the United States Postal Service has long been 
recognized: 
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are 
as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except 
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as to their outward form and weight, as if they were 
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of 
the people to be secure in their papers against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their 
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may 
be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and 
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be 
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to 
search in one's own household. No law of Congress can 
place in the hands of officials connected with the postal 
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters 
and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations 
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in 
subordination to the great principle embodied in the 
fourth amendment of the Constitution. 
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877). 
No similar constitutional proscription is applicable to 
private parcel carriers. Thus, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), the court found no 
violation of the fourth amendment where a package was opened and 
examined by employees of Federal Express, a private freight 
carrier, and found to contain cocaine. "[T]he fact that agents of 
the private carrier independently opened the package and made an 
examination that might have been impermissible for a government 
agent cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct 
unreasonable." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114-5, 104 S.Ct. at 1657. 
Indeed, the distinction drawn by the trial court, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, would entirely eviscerate the 
fourth amendment. Trial courts would only have to observe that 
police officers, in effectuating challenged searches and seizures, 
were merely performing the function of private security guards. 
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The trial court erred in denying Ms. Ellingsworth's 
motion to suppress on the basis that employees of statutorily 
created Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah are not state actors 
subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment. 
B. THE USE OF MS. ELLINGSWORTH1 S MEDICAL 
RECORDS TO PROSECUTE HER FOR FRAUD 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE LIMITED CONSENT 
FORM SHE SIGNED. 
To be proper under the fourth amendment, the State has 
the burden of showing that an exception to the warrant requirement 
is applicable to a warrantless search. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Consent 
is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State 
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Durand, 569 
P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1977); State v. Kelsev, 532 P.2d 1001, 1004 
(Utah 1975) . "Even when a constitutionally valid consent is given, 
the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the scope of the 
consent, and police activity that exceeds the scope of the consent 
violates the Fourth Amendment." State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1218 
(Utah 1993) ; accord Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100 
S.Ct. 2395, 2401/ 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). "The standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--^hat wyald the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between 
the officer and the suspect?" State v. Castner, 825 P. 2d 699, 705 
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 
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S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)); accord State v. 
Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 552 n.6 (Utah App. 1994). 
The written consent Ms. Ellingsworth signed here 
contained the express limitation, "This information will be used 
for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers 
compensation benefits." This limiting language constrained the 
State to using the medical records it obtained only in determining 
whether the Workers' Compensation Fund would pay benefits. "The 
terms of the consent limit police authority to search in the same 
fashion as the terms of a search warrant." State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 
1201, 1218 (Utah 1993) . The State exceeded the express limits of 
the consent it obtained, and used the information it obtained to 
prosecute Ms. Ellingsworth for fraud. 
In similar circumstances, courts have held the 
limitations contained in a consent to be binding on the State, and 
have suppressed the results of uses of evidence exceeding those 
allowed in the consent. In In re J.W.K. , 1988 WL 61133 (Minn.App. 
1998) ,9 a juvenile was one of four persons suspected of involvement 
in vandalizing a golf course and stealing golf carts. Police 
requested blood samples of all four suspects to compare to evidence 
found at the scene. J.W.K. and his mother signed a consent form 
authorizing the sheriff's department to M/[t]ak[e] blood from 
[J.W.K.] to compare against evidence from where one of the golf 
carts was stored for a short time.7" J.W.K. at *1. After the 
9In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (11) (B) , this 
decision obtained from Westlaw is reproduced in full in addendum B. 
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blood was drawn, another suspect confessed and J.W.K.'s sample was 
never compared to the golf course evidence. Id. 
However, J.W.K. was also a suspect in a residential 
burglary. His blood sample was compared to evidence obtained in 
that crime and found to match. When confronted with the test 
results, J.W.K. confessed. The district court ordered the test 
results and confession suppressed. Id. 
The appellate court affirmed the suppression: 
We conclude that the scope of J.W.K.'s consent 
is limited by the terms of its authorization. [ ] Here, 
suppression was proper because the use of J.W.K.'s blood 
sample to compare to evidence from the burglary exceeded 
the scope of the consent. The plain language of the 
consent form prepared by law enforcement undermines the 
State's contrary argument. [ ] Police ignored their own 
explicit assurance to J.W.K. that his blood would be used 
only for evidence related to the golf course crime, and 
instead used it for evidence of an unrelated crime. 
Obtaining consent to search for evidence of one crime and 
using that consent to search for evidence of another 
crime exceeds the scope of the consent. [ ] 
In re J.W.K., 1998 WL 61133 at *2 (cites omitted). 
In Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 960, 91 S. Ct. 353, 27 L.Ed.2d 269 (1970), Mr. 
Graves was arrested for public drunkenness. Shortly after his 
arrest, police became aware that he fit the description of the 
assailant in a recent rape. Police asked Mr. Graves for a blood 
sample. He initially refused, "but finally consented when he was 
informed that the sample would be used only to determine the 
alcoholic content of his blood." 424 F.2d at 525. The blood was 
tested for blood type, and was found to be of the same type as the 
rapist. The court affirmed the district court's finding that 
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testing Mr. Graves7 blood for blood type without a warrant violated 
his fourth amendment rights. " [I]n this case we do not void the 
consent as to the purpose for which it was given. In the presence 
of misrepresentation in its acquisition, we simply limit the state 
to the purposes represented." Graves. 424 F.2d at 526 n.2. Cf. 
United States v. Andrews, 746 F.2d 247, 250 (5th Cir. 1984),cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985),10 
where police deception in getting a felon to turn over guns was 
found not to violate the constitution, where "there is no evidence 
indicating that Andrews was assured his production of the guns 
would only be used to investigate the robberies." Accord United 
States v. Davis, 749 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (felon showed 
officers his firearms to show he had no machinegun; "There is no 
evidence that they at any time assured Davis that his production of 
the guns would be used only to ascertain whether any of them were 
machine guns."), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 
L.Ed.2d 409 (1986). 
The facts here show that the consent signed by Ms. 
Ellingsworth contained the express limitation, "This information 
will be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for 
workers compensation benefits." Contrary to this representation by 
the Workers' Compensation Fund, the records were in fact used to 
prosecute Ms. Ellingsworth for Workers' Compensation fraud. This 
10Overruled on other grounds in United States v. Hurtado, 905 
F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1990) (voluntariness of consent need only be 
established by preponderance, rather than clear and convincing 
evidence as stated in Andrews). 
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exceeded the scope of the consent. The medical records and the 
fruits of those records must be suppressed as they were obtained in 
violation of the fourth amendment. 
C. ALTERNATIVELY, THE STATE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT MS. ELLINGSWORTH 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO HAVE THE MEDICAL 
RECORDS RELEASED TO THE STATE FOR USE IN 
PROSECUTING HER FOR FRAUD. 
For the State to show consent, "the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact 
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, 
express or implied." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Voluntariness is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of the 
circumstances. Id. at 248-9, 93 S.Ct. at 2059. In State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court set forth 
a non-exhaustive list of factors that could be considered: 
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion 
include: 1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force 
by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. 
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the State 
cannot establish a voluntary consent to have the State use Ms. 
Ellingsworth's medical records for any and all purposes, including 
criminal prosecution of her. Significantly, here there was a claim 
of authority. Ms. Valente testified: 
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A. I explained to her that we needed to go ahead 
and collect her prior medicals as part of the 
investigation onto [sic] her claim and that it was part 
of the investigation and she was required to cooperate. 
R. 213:24-5 (emphasis added). A claim of authority by itself is 
sufficient to defeat a finding of voluntariness: 
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to 
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of 
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and 
voluntarily given." This burden cannot be discharged by 
showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority. [] . . . 
When a law enforcement officer claims authority 
to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect 
that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The 
situation is instinct with coercion--albeit colorably 
lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be 
consent. 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-9, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 
20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Ms. Valente's explanation to Ms. 
Ellingsworth that "she was required to cooperate" vitiates any 
possibility of the existence of voluntary consent. 
In addition, the consent form signed by Ms. Ellingsworth 
as part of her required cooperation stated, "This information will 
be used for the sole purpose of evaluating my claim for workers 
compensation benefits." Contrary to that representation, the State 
used the information to prosecute Ms. Ellingsworth. This 
misrepresentation by itself is sufficient to negate the existence 
of voluntary consent: 
It is a well established rule that a consent 
search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the 
consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or 
misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue agent. United 
States v. Rothstein, 530 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972) cert, 
denied, 409 U.S. 843, 93 S. Ct. 43, 34 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972); 
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United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971) 
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 944, 30 L.Ed.2d 788 
(1972); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th 
Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S. Ct. 242, 27 
L.Ed.2d 247 (1970); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 
1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 
S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d 62 (1970). 
United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); accord 
United States v. Wuaaneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1982), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983). 
The Workers' Compensation Fund employees involved in 
investigating Ms. Ellingsworth, like IRS employees, usually are 
involved in determining civil obligations but may also get involved 
in criminal investigations. Like the IRS, they may not obtain 
valid consent through deceit, trickery or misrepresentation. See 
also McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 403 (Colo. 1981) ("Where, as 
here, entry into the home is gained by a preconceived deception as 
to purpose, consent in the constitutional sense is lacking."). 
Collectively, the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent form establish that no voluntary consent to 
use Ms. Ellingsworth's medical records for any purpose other than 
evaluating her claim was granted. As one court has stated: 
Intimidation and deceit are not the norms of 
voluntarism. In order for the response to be free, the 
stimulus must be devoid of mendacity. We do not hesitate 
to undo fraudulently induced contracts. Are the 
disabilitie here less maleficent? 
Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101, 110 (5th Cir. 1968) . Ms. 
Ellingsworth's medical records and the fruits of those records must 
be suppressed as they were obtained in violation of the fourth 
amendment. 
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D. MS. ELLINGSWORTH WAS PREJUDICED BY THE 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
Ms. Ellingsworth's medical records were discussed 
prominently in the prosecutor's opening statement. R. 213:127-9, 
131. Paola Valente testified concerning execution of the medical 
records release, and testified that she received several hundred 
medical records in response to the request she sent out. R. 
214:334-339. She forwarded the records to Dr. Chung, an 
independent medical examiner who examined Ms. Ellingsworth at the 
request of Workers' Compensation Fund. R. 214:340-1, -346, -347-8, 
352. Exhibit 10-A, a timeline chart of preexisting illnesses, was 
compiled from the medical records. R. 214:350-1. Exhibit 10-B 
extended the timeline, with the two charts covering the period from 
January 27, 1987 through February 10, 1995. R. 214:353. Though 
neither chart was received into evidence, R. 214:360-1, they were 
discussed in the presence of the jury, R. 214:350-353, leaving the 
definite impression that the State had a mountain of evidence 
concerning Ms. Ellingsworth's preexisting back injuries. 
Dorothy Prewitt, Director of Medical Records at St. 
Mark's Hospital, testified concerning records from March 27, 1976 
through the time of the alleged offense indicating that Ms. 
Ellingsworth had visited the hospital eighty times, including 74 
emergency room visits. R. 214:402-408. 
Dr. Bruce Argyle testified about his treatment of Ms. 
Ellingsworth on January 30, 1994 at Cottonwood Hospital for an 
upper back injury sustained while moving furniture. R. 214:411-7. 
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He testified concerning a second visit on February 11, 1994, again 
complaining of upper back pain. R. 214:415-417. His reports were 
admitted as Exhibit 15. R. 214:413, 416, 417 (report identified), 
442 (admitted). 
Dr. Robert Gannon testified about his treatment of Ms. 
Ellingsworth at Holy Cross Hospital (currently Salt Lake Regional 
Hospital) on March 16, 1994 for upper back pain secondary to moving 
furniture. R. 214:421-5. His report was admitted as Exhibit 16. 
R. 214:423-5 (identified), 442 (admitted). 
Dr. Rhonda Smith testified about her treatment of Ms. 
Ellingsworth at Holy Cross on May 18, 1994 for upper back, neck, 
and shoulder pain. R. 214:429-33. Her report was admitted as 
Exhibit 17. R. 214:430-1 (identified), 442 (admitted). 
Ms. Valente testified that the medical records contained 
a report of an emergency room visit secondary to a domestic assault 
on October 14, 1994, and that this was how she first learned this 
information. R. 214:351. She testified that based on the 
information learned from the medical reports concerning preexisting 
and subsequent injuries, she would not have paid benefits to Ms. 
Ellingsworth. R. 214:356-3 60. 
Dr. Jeff Chung testified about the Independent Medical 
Examination (IME) that he performed on Ms. Ellingsworth on January 
11, 1995. He originally concluded that she had musculoskeletal 
injury, and recommended a work hardening program (physical therapy 
for eight hours a day, five days a week). R. 214:446-450. After 
examining the medical records at issue here, including Exhibits 15, 
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16, and 17, he filed an addendum to his report stating his 
conclusion that he did not believe that her complaints of pain were 
the result of an injury on October 12, 1994 at Blynco 
Manufacturing. R. 214:451-3, 462-3. 
The medical records were critical to the State throughout 
the presentation of its case. Derivative evidence obtained through 
exploitation of the records included the State's discovery of the 
October 14 domestic assault,11 the change in Dr. Chung's conclusion 
concerning whether the pain Ms. Ellingsworth experienced was the 
result of a work related accident, R. 214:451-3, 462-3; and the 
discovery of Drs. Argyle, Gannon, and Smith who testified 
concerning prior upper back injury.12 
Absent the above testimony, the State's case was far from 
compelling. All that remained was the evidence concerning Ms. 
Ellingsworth's statements to Brett Mann of the investigative unit 
of Workers' Compensation Fund. Mr. Mann was assigned to the case 
on February 7, 1995 to investigate allegations of a preexisting 
condition that was not revealed. R. 215:488. Mr. Mann interviewed 
Ms. Ellingsworth on February 27, 1995, and was soon joined by Ms. 
Valente. R. 215:490. Ms. Ellingsworth was asked multiple times 
whether she had any previous shoulder or back injury, and responded 
^Presented at trial through the testimony of Deputy Steven 
Anjewierden, who investigated the domestic assault, R. 213:189-203; 
the testimony of Mr. Cal Kunz, an EMT who transported Ms. 
Ellingsworth to the hospital, R. 213:204-228; and the testimony of 
Dr. Steven Minnaugh, the emergency room physician who examined Ms. 
Ellingsworth, R. 213:248-272. 
12Their testimony is contained at R. 214:411-421, 421-7, and 
428-36 respectively. 
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negatively. R. 215:492-5, 499-500. She likewise responded that 
she had no subsequent injuries. R. 215:493-4, 496. On cross-
examination and redirect, the record reveals that the questioning 
proceeded as follows: 
Q. One of the first things I want to ask you about 
is any prior injuries you sustained to the industrial 
injury of October 12th, 1994. Can you go through your 
medical history for us and explain?" 
A. My first industrial accident I had was in 1980. 
That was a knee injury. That was not through Workers' 
Comp. That was through WASAU[.] 
Q. Do you have any prior history with your 
shoulder and back? 
A. No. 
R. 215:509-10. 
Then she was asked is she had any other injuries since 
the industrial accident, and she responded negatively. R. 215:510. 
A. I had to have my ulcers cut out of my stomach, 
so that had nothing to do. 
Q. What about the last couple of years? 
A. No. 
Q. Brenda, would you be surprised to know that we 
have medical files from numerous hospitals, numerous 
emergency rooms? 
A. And they are Workers' Compensation? 
Q. No. Not under Workers' Compensation. 
A. I have had other injuries, yes. 
Q. Okay, have you had any injuries since October 
12th, 1994? 
A. No, I haven't. 
By Ms. Valente: Not necessarily industrial, just 
any injury at all. 
Q. Any injury. 
A. I get migraines. Sometimes I have to go to the 
hospital. 
Q. Okay, but you haven't had an injury? 
A. No. 
Q. You haven't been injured in any way, shape or 
form since the industrial accident? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
R.215:511-2, 523-4. 
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On Page 4 of the interview, Mr. Mann started discussi 
the assault: 
to, 
Q. When did you move from that location? 
A. I have lived there for about seven months. 
Q. Seven months? 
A. Uh-huh. I think I know what you are referring 
Q. Yeah, I hoped you would. 
A. Yeah, my husband came there and beat me up. Is 
that what you are talking about? 
Q. I am asking if you had any injuries since the 
industrial accident. 
A. Well, I wasn't quite sure what --
Q. That's why we sat and explained it to you. Not 
necessarily Workers' Comp, any type of injury at all. 
A. Okay. Well, he beat me up and stuff. I did go 
to the hospital for that. 
R. 215:512-4. 
Later, the interview continues: 
Q. Okay. Which is a lot more than what you are 
telling us. A lot, lot more. And some of them have been 
back pain, shoulder pain which is prior to the injury 
date with the Fund. You don't recall any of those 
visits? 
A. No, I never turned anything in. 
Q. I am not saying that you turned it in. I am 
saying that you went to the ER and you complained of back 
pain and shoulder pain. 
A. Yeah, I had previous back pain and stuff, but 
nothing like I was having after I got hurt. I explained 
that to those people. 
R. 215:514-5. 
Q. So you don't remember all the doctors and all 
the emergencies visits? 
A. What I am saying is I am under medication. I 
don't know the stuff. 
Q. I understand that. 
A I am just having a hard time thinking right 
now; whereas, if I had paperwork and stuff at home, it 
would be easier. I don't have a problem with giving that 
to you. 
R. 215:516-7. 
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Prior to this interview, Ms. Ellingsworth had just been 
released from the hospital after her ulcer surgery. R. 215:518. 
In a subsequent telephone interview on March 3, 1995, Ms. 
Ellingsworth indicated that she believed her prior back problems 
were lower back problems rather than upper back problems. R. 
215:501-3. 
On the whole, reasonable minds could come to different 
conclusions from these statements. Ms. Ellingsworth, recently 
released from the hospital and still on medication, appears 
confused and has trouble understanding that the State is seeking 
information about ANY other injury, rather than just Workers' 
Compensation claims. The record reveals that Ms. Ellingsworth only 
completed the seventh grade, having quit school to have a son at 
age 13. R. 215:535. She testified that she did not understand 
that the State wanted information about ANY injury. R. 215:552, 
554, 556-7. The statements made to Mr. Mann do not lead to an 
overwhelming conclusion that Ms. Ellingsworth intentionally or 
knowingly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-109 (1994). Quite possibly, she was just confused. Without 
the medical records and derivative evidence, a more favorable 
result is probable. This Court should reverse. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
PROSECUTOR TO ASK MS. ELLINGSWORTH TO COMMENT 
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF OTHER WITNESSES. 
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During trial, the trial court twice allowed the 
prosecutor to ask Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of 
State witnesses: 
Q. Okay. Well she testified -- this is my 
recollection, and the Jury will give this the weight that 
they deem it deserves. She said that this had never 
happened before. Is it your testimony that she lied or 
misled the court? 
A. I don't believe she used those specific words. 
She said, "By pulling on a blind cord, " to the best of my 
knowledge. That's all I believe she said. 
R. 564 (emphasis added). 
Q. Did you hear him [Dr. Seeman] testify 
repeatedly that he knew nothing about that until this 
case was convened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He isn't lying? 
A. I don't believe --
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, objection. She can't 
comment on the credibility of another witness. 
MR. GARDNER: But she can comment about what's going 
on here. Her testimony is one way someone else is --
pardon me. She is saying she lied under oath, is what 
she is saying. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Don't answer that, Miss Ellingsworth. 
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I think she can say that 
she's saying something different, but she can't say, 
"Yes, he's lying." I mean, it may be inadvertent on Dr. 
Seeman's part. J think it is inappropriate for one 
witness to comment on the credibility of another. 
THE COURT: I think that's what the whole trial is 
about. 
She can answer. 
MR. GARDNER: Do you need me to repeat that 
question? 
A. No, I understood. 
No, I don't believe that Dr. Seeman was lying. But 
towards the end, Dr. Seeman was having health problems 
and he had had strokes and stuff and he wasn't keeping 
track of things in the office like he should have been. 
So he could have forgotten, or, you know, I am not saying 
he was lying. 
R. 215:568-9 (emphasis added). 
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It is misconduct for the prosecutor to ask a witness to 
comment on the credibility of a witness. In State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), this 
court reversed under a plain error standard of review. In Palmer, 
the prosecutor questioned the defendant concerning whether an 
alleged child abuse victim and his mother were "mistaken or lying." 
860 P.2d at 343-4. This court, quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 787 (Utah 1992), held that asking a witness about another 
witnesses's veracity was obvious error. Accord State v. Begishe, 
937 P. 2d 527, 528 n.l (Utah App. 1997) . Here, defense counsel 
properly objected to the prosecutor's line of questioning and was 
overruled. This was error. 
Arguably, defense counsel's objection may not serve to 
preserve the issue with respect to the first instance where the 
prosecutor asked Ms. Ellingsworth to comment on the credibility of 
another witness. However, this question certainly constitutes 
plain error. Palmer was decided July 22, 1993, almost 4 years 
prior to trial in the instant case in May of 1997. Palmer held 
that even as of that date it is plain error to ask a witness to 
comment on the credibility of another witness. 
Under the unique facts of this case, a finding of plain 
error is especially appropriate. In addressing a pretrial motion, 
defense counsel started to argue State v. Rimmasch, 775 F.2d 388 
(Utah 1989): 
MS. AH CHING: --if you're going to make a -- what 
the Court -- what Rimmasch says, Judge, is two things: 
Number one -- and I hope the Court is familiar with 
Rimmasch. 
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THE COURT: I'm familiar with Rimmasch. 
MS. AH CHING: That was a case where expert 
witnesses provided testimony that, number one --
THE COURT: Why do you ask me if I'm familiar with 
Rimmasch and them go on to tell me what the case says. 
I said, "Yes." 
MS. AH CHING: Your Honor, I need to establish for 
the record -- I mean, if the Court of Appeals is going to 
say that I was ineffective in representing Miss 
Ellingsworth if I don't provide a basis for what I'm 
asking the Court to do. 
THE COURT: I told you that I was familiar with the 
case. Go ahead and make your argument. 
R. 213:13. 
The first issue addressed in Rimmasch is whether a 
witness may testify concerning the truthfulness of a witness on a 
prior occasion: 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides in pertinent part: 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked 
or supported by evidence in the form of 
opinion or reputation, but subject to these 
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only 
to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness... . 
This rule permits testimony concerning a 
witness's general character or reputation for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness but prohibits any 
testimony as to a witness's truthfulness on a particular 
occasion. 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989). In the context 
of the trial court's repeated pronouncements of his familiarity 
with Rimmasch, it is particularly troubling that he concluded that 
"I think that's what the whole trial is about" in response to 
defense counsel's assertion that it is inappropriate for one 
witness to comment on the credibility of another. A finding of 
plain error is warranted. 
The errors here were harmful. To obtain a conviction, 
the prosecution had to establish that Ms. Ellingsworth 
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intentionally or knowingly "devised a scheme or artifice to obtain 
. medical benefits . . . by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions" and 
that a communication was made in furtherance of the scheme or 
artifice. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2) (1994). The prosecutor's 
questioning placed Ms. Ellingsworth in the untenable position of 
either having to comment negatively on other witnesses, a prospect 
that makes her less likable to the jury, or suffer the risk that 
the jury will draw the inference that it is her testimony that is 
a prevarication. Critical to Ms. Ellingsworth's defense was the 
preservation of her credibility, and her ability to persuade the 
jury that any omissions made were an honest error resulting from 
her own confusion and lack of education. She would be convicted if 
the jury rejected her testimony, R. 215:552, 556-7, that she did 
not inform the Workers' Compensation Fund of preexisting and 
subsequent injuries because she did not believe they were relevant. 
In cases where credibility is critical to the jury's 
determination of the disputed facts, courts have not hesitated to 
reverse. For example: 
Since defendant's determination of guilt was based 
substantially on the jury's assessment of the credibility 
of the victim versus the credibility of the defendant, we 
cannot say that absent Allred's testimony bolstering the 
credibility of the victim, there would not have been a 
result more favorable to defendant. Our confidence in 
the verdict is undermined. 
State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1989) 
Since this case depended on the jury's assessment of the 
victim's credibility versus the defendant's, and there is 
not "other evidence [to support] the defendant's 
conviction," Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501, beyond that which 
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is tainted by Deputy Purdy's improper testimony, we 
cannot say that absent the error there is not a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result to the 
defendant. 
State v. Iorcr, 801 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah App. 1990) . 
The State's case against Stefaniak hinged entirely on the 
credibility of the victim. The sole issue in dispute 
was whether Stefaniak removed his swimming suit, thereby 
exposing himself to C.C. There was no physical evidence 
introduced, nor was there testimony from the other 
children who accompanied the victim and Stefaniak on the 
trip to Bear Lake. The victim's report was first made 
several months after the incident, in the midst of 
domestic turmoil between the victim's mother and 
Stefaniak. " [T]his case depended on the jury's 
assessment of the victim's credibility versus the 
defendant's, and there is not 'other evidence [to 
support] the defendant's conviction' ... beyond that 
which is tainted by ... improper testimony." [State v. 
Iorg, 801 P.2d] at 942 (quoting State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501 (Utah 1986)) . Accordingly, "we cannot say that 
absent the error there is not a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result to the defendant. "[] Id. 
State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah App. 1995) . 
The prosecutor's improper questioning here adversely 
impacted Ms. Ellingsworth's credibility. Absent these errors, a 
better result is probable. This Court should reverse. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR 
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO MISREPRESENT THE 
EVIDENCE. 
At trial, the prosecutor repeatedly misrepresented the 
evidence. In his opening statement, the prosecutor stated: 
And she was treated by a medical doctor there. And she 
claimed [sic:complained] of back pain to both the police 
officer -- and you are going to hear Steve Anjewierden 
from the Sheriff's Office testify. He was the officer on 
the case. He made a report. He'll testify that she told 
him she had been beaten repeatedly and injured in the 
face and jaw and the upper back. She told the ambulance 
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driver, Cal Kunz -- he was with Gold Cross Ambulance 
Service, the same thing. 
R. 213:125-6 (emphasis added) . In fact, only Cal Kunz was told of 
back pain. See R. 213:189-204 (entire testimony of Anjewierden), 
especially at 201-2 (Ms. Ellingsworth did not tell the officer she 
was thrown against a wall, officer doesn't recall being told of 
back injury, nothing in report indicating back injury). 
In cross-examining Ms. Ellingsworth, the prosecutor 
asked: 
Q. Okay. You also testified that you told Paola 
Valente, when you talked to her by phone on October 17th, 
about the domestic violence assault that happened three 
days earlier; is that your testimony? 
A. I don't recall. I don't remember saying those 
specific words. 
Q. Do you remember telling the Jury that you told 
Paola Valente all the information she asked you for? 
A. Yes. But Paola Valente didn't come our and 
say, "Has your -- does your husband beat you?" That's 
not something -- you know, "Had you been assaulted?", you 
know, she didn't ask me anything like that, no. 
Q. Okay. But when you talked to her on the phone 
on October the 17th, you didn't tell her about the fact 
that three days earlier you had been assaulted; did you? 
A. I felt that it was irrelevant because it wasn't 
the same area that I hurt at work. 
Q. Okay. A few minutes ago I thought I heard you 
testify that you told Paola Valente about this assault. 
Did I misunderstand you or did your testimony change? 
A. I may have misunderstood you. I don't know. 
R. 215:570-2 (emphasis added). In fact, her prior testimony had 
been that she provided Ms. Valente with everything she asked for, 
R. 215:549-50, and that she did not mention to Ms. Valente or Mr. 
Mann that she had been assaulted because it was to a different area 
than was injured at work, R. 215:559-60. 
Later examination included: 
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Q. You were telling him as truthfully as you 
could? 
A. Yes. But I was also heavily medicated at that 
time. 
Q. But you knew you had just come out of the 
hospital; didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Because he testified he asked you if you'd been 
hospitalized recently, and you said, "No." 
A. He knew. 
Q. Did you remember that at all? 
A. He knew that I had been in a hospital. I had 
talked to Paula Valente from the hospital. 
Q. But Brett Mann was the one talking to you then? 
A. I assumed he knew. 
Q. Do you remember him asking you if you had been 
hospitalized recently? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you remember telling him, no, you hadn't? 
A. No. 
Q. Any reason to believe this transcript and his 
testimony was inaccurate? 
A. I don't remember any of it. 
R. 215:583-4 (emphasis added). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
And on cross examination suddenly it is "Well, I just 
can't remember. I can't remember anything that happened 
to me because I had just gotten out of the hospital. And 
I asked, "Well, didn't he ask you if you had been in the 
hospital recently?" And you heard Brett Mann testify 
that he asked that specific question, "Have you been in 
the hospital recently?" And the Defendant said, "No," 
twice. She said, no, she had not been hospitalized 
recently. Well, today she said, "I got out of the 
hospital just one or two days before, and I had been in 
there for a month. " 
Ladies and Gentlemen, if you are in the 
hospital for a month to have some major work done on your 
stomach and you just get out of the hospital one or two 
days earlier and you are meeting with someone that says, 
"Have you been in the hospital?", I suggest that each one 
of you would say, "Well, yes, I have. I just got out. 
I have been in for a month." But not the Defendant. She 
denied repeatedly that she had ever been in the hospital. 
And I suggest that that's part of the pattern that the 
Defendant was trying to use to keep Workers' Compensation 
in the dark and keep the money coming and keep the 
medical benefits coming and keep the drugs coming. 
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R. 215:612-13 (emphasis added). 
In fact, Mr. Mann testified he asked her, "Have you been 
seen by a hospital other than your recent visit recently?1' R. 
215:495 (emphasis added). "And you haven't been since the 
industrial injury to now? The only time you have been in the 
hospital is your recent stay?" R. 215:496 (emphasis added). 
This questioning and argument was plain error. 
Prosecutors are not at liberty to introduce unsupported innuendo. 
"Generally, it is error to ask an accused a question that implies 
the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can 
prove the existence of the fact. Otherwise, the only limit on 
such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's imagination." 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-7 (Utah 1992) . Accord State v. 
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) 
(questioning about prior convictions after denial by witness 
improper absent extrinsic proof of convictions); State v. Palmer, 
860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 
1993) . 
The prosecutor should not have indicated in his opening 
statement that Officer Anjewierden would testify that Ms. 
Ellingsworth told him that her back was injured by her husband in 
the domestic assault. He testified to the contrary. His report, 
which the prosecutor doubtless used in trial preparation,13 
indicates nothing of the kind. R. 213:201-2. 
13See R. 213:194-196 (prosecutor shows officer his report, and 
offers it [unsuccessfully] into evidence). 
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This error should be addressed by this Court. In a 
similar context, the Palmer court noted: 
The next question is whether the error is obvious. The 
trial judge could not know whether later evidence would 
support the inculpatory inferences of the prosecutor's 
questions. Thus, we cannot say the error was obvious. 
However, this is a circumstance "when an error not 
readily apparent to the court" does not raise an 
"insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 n. 8 (Utah 1989). In this case, the 
egregious nature of the prosecutor's question and the 
strong inculpatory inferences contained therein lead us 
"to dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that 
justice can be done." Id. Unless we apply this 
exception, this type of error would always escape review 
under the obviousness requirement. 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993). 
The prosecutor's assertion in cross-examining Ms. 
Ellingsworth that she had testified that she told Ms. Valente about 
the domestic assault is wholly unsupported. This should have been 
obvious to the trial court. The prosecutor's assertion that Ms. 
Ellingsworth denied having been recently hospitalized in her 
interview with Mr. Mann is likewise made of whole cloth. Mr. Mann 
testified that he was asking about hospitalizations "other than 
your recent visit recently." The prosecutor used this purported 
evidence, which was wholly of his own creation, to argue in closing 
that this purported evidence established a scheme or artifice to 
defraud. The jury was invited to convict Ms. Ellingsworth on the 
basis of non-existent evidence that the prosecutor manufactured in 
his own imagination. 
Ms. Ellingsworth has been prejudiced. It is entirely 
possible that she was convicted on the basis of the jury's 
acceptance of the prosecutor's concocted assertion that Ms. 
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Ellingsworth denied the existence of her one month hospitalization 
for stomach surgery. The unsupported innuendo concerning Officer 
Anjewierden in opening statement placed before the jury yet another 
piece of fabricated evidence that the jury could rely upon in 
convicting her. Absent these errors, a better result is probable. 
Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of 
several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) . Here, the improper 
questioning of Ms. Ellingsworth by asking her to comment on the 
credibility of other witnesses acted in conjunction with the 
improper evidence manufactured by the prosecutor to deprive Ms. 
Ellingsworth of a fair trial. By improperly impugning Ms. 
Ellingsworth's credibility, and arguing nonexistent evidence as a 
basis for conviction, the integrity of the jury verdict has been 
compromised. This court should reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Ellingsworth respectfully 
requests that the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress be 
reversed, that her conviction be reversed, and that the case be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Medical Records Release (Ex. S18-A) 
AUTHORIZATION TO FURNISH MEDICAL OR OTHER INFORMATION 
Patient/Claimant: 
Claim Number: 
Date of Injury: 
Employer: 
Social Security: 
Date of Birth: 
BRENDA ELLINGSWORTH 
9429549-A7 
10/12/1994 
BLYNCO MANUFACTURING & DISTRIB 
528-02-6811 
6/21/1961 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
I hereby authorize any physician, surgeon, or other medical professional, 
nurse, dentist, hospital, ambulance service, rehabilitation/convalescence/ 
custodial facility, or other medical provider,,and any group insurance carrier 
or other company or individual and all of my employers present and past, to 
furnish to the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah all records in their 
possession regarding myself including records regarding injuries, medical 
history, physical condition, insurance claims, and employment records both 
before and after the date of my signature on this form, regardless of the 
time of occurrence. This information will be used for the sole purpose of 
evaluating my claim for workers compensation benefits, 
( ) IF X-RAYS WERE TAKEN, SEND ONLY THE READING OR DIAGNOSIS; 
DO NOT SEND THE X-RAY FILMS. 
( ) SEND THE READING OR DIAGNOSIS AND THE X-RAY FILMS. 
Unless arrangements have been made for an authorized representative of the 
Workers Compensation Fund to pick up the records, said records should be 
mailed to: 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P.O. BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157 
Please put the above claim number on the records when you send them. 
A complete photocopy of this authorization shall be accepted as if it were 
a signed original. By signing this release, I represent that I have read 
the information on this page and understand the authorization I now make. 
j/stfa&q5 
Date of Authorization P a t i e n t ' s Signatil^e 
3T7£ So 77huU*A ^ \MA 
Address 
.2«fa &b. itak ***> 
City, State, Zip 
SPECIAL RELEASE: In addition to the above, please release record 
pertaining to psychiatric, drug, or alcohol treatment, if any. 
Date of Authorization Patient's Signature 
PROVIDER LIST 
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ADDENDUM B 
Decision In In re J.W.K., 1998 WL 61133 (Minn.App. 1998) 
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY 
— N.W.2d — 
(Cite as: 1998 WL 61133 (Minn.App.)) 
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.W.K., Child. 
No. CX-97-1696. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. 
Feb. 17, 1998. 
Syllabus by the Court 
*1 When a juvenile signs a consent form allowing 
police to compare the juvenile's blood to evidence 
found at a specified crime scene, the district court may 
properly suppress evidence obtained without consent 
that compares the juvenile's blood to evidence found at 
another crime scene. 
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OPINION 
KLAPHAKE, Judge. 
The district court ordered suppression of J.W.K.'s 
blood comparison test and confession, ruling that the 
blood test exceeded the scope of J.W.K.'s consent and 
the confession was the fruit of the unconstitutional 
search. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On May 27, 1996, a home in New London was 
burglarized and vandalized. Police collected blood 
they found splattered in the home. The investigating 
detective suspected J.W.K., then 15 years old, of the 
crime. 
On October 12, 1996, someone vandalized a New 
London golf course and stole golf carts. Evidence led 
investigating officers to include J.W.K. as one of four 
suspects. Police requested blood samples from all four 
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suspects to compare to evidence found at the 
vandalized crime scene. On October 17, both J.W.K. 
and his mother consented to have J.W.K. give a blood 
sample and signed a form: "Consent/Permission to 
Search." The form authorized the sheriffs department 
to "[t]ak[e] blood from [J.W.K.] to compare against 
evidence from where one of the golf carts was stored 
for a short time." Both J.W.K. and his mother testified 
that they consented to a blood test to clear J.W.K. of 
any involvement in the golf course crimes. They were 
not asked and did not consent to a comparison of the 
blood sample to evidence found at the burglary. 
J.W.K.'s blood was drawn but was never tested or 
compared to evidence found at the golf course because 
a different suspect confessed to that crime. 
Investigating officers in the golf course crime informed 
the burglary investigator that they had a sample of 
J.W.K.'s blood that they no longer needed, and they 
turned the blood sample over to him. A test comparing 
J.K.W.'s blood sample against the evidence found at 
the burglary linked J.K.W. to the burglary. On April 
14, J.W.K. and his mother were informed of the test 
results, J.W.K. was interviewed, and J.W.K. confessed 
to the burglary. 
At a pretrial hearing, J.W.K. moved to suppress 
evidence of the blood tests and his ensuing confession. 
The district court ordered the evidence suppressed. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by suppressing the blood test 
and confession? 
ANALYSIS 
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I of the Minnesota 
Constitution proscribe unreasonable searches." State 
v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1996). Absent 
exigent circumstances, a warrantless search is per se 
unreasonable. Id. While a search warrant is normally 
required for the taking of blood, a defendant can waive 
this Fourth Amendment right by consenting to the 
search. State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 340 
(Minn. 1977). 
*2 The state argues that once J.W.K. submitted a 
blood sample, he no longer had a privacy interest in the 
identifying information contained in his blood. The 
state relies on cases upholding the constitutionality of 
blood tests to create DNA data banks. However, the 
lessened privacy interest recognized by Rise v. 
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Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) and similar cases 
was limited to the privacy interest of convicted felons: 
Once a person is convicted of one of the felonies 
included as predicate offenses * * * his identity has 
become a matter of state interest and he has lost any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying 
information derived from the blood sampling. 
Id. at 1560. Accord Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 
1340 (10th Cir.1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 
306-07 (4th Cir.1992). These cases do not diminish 
J.W.K/s legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
information contained in his blood. See Gilbert, 262 
N.W.2d at 340 (Fourth Amendment requires warrant or 
consent to obtain suspect's blood sample); accord 
Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir.1991) 
(warrantless testing of blood for HIV antibodies that 
are not evanescent violated Fourth Amendment); State 
v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 
(N.C.I986) (blood type not evanescent and test 
without warrant violated Fourth Amendment); State v. 
Comeaux, 786 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) 
(state violated defendant's fourth amendment rights 
when it searched defendant's blood obtained pursuant 
to valid consent but tested for purpose unrelated to 
consent), review denied (Tex. Nov. 6, 1991). 
We conclude that the scope of J.W.K.'s consent is 
limited by the terms of its authorization. See State v. 
Schweich, 414 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn.App. 1987); 
see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 
100 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). Here, 
suppression was proper because the use of J.W.K.'s 
blood sample to compare to evidence from the 
burglary exceeded the scope of consent. The plain 
language of the consent form prepared by law 
enforcement undermines the state's contrary argument. 
Cf. Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc., 
530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995) (any ambiguity in 
contract construed against drafter). Police ignored 
their own explicit assurance to J.W.K. that his blood 
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would be used only for evidence related to the golf 
course crime, and instead used it for evidence of an 
unrelated crime. Obtaining consent to search for 
evidence of one crime and using that consent to search 
for evidence of another crime exceeds the scope of the 
consent. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d at 230. 
*3 When police decided to compare J.W.K.'s blood 
with evidence found at the residential crime, they 
conducted an additional search without J.W.K.'s 
consent and without a warrant. This additional search 
violated J.W.K.'s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. 
(search that exceeds authorized consent is 
unreasonable and violations Fourth Amendment); cf. 
Walter, 447 U.S. at 654, 100 S.Ct. at 2400 (although 
law enforcement lawfully possessed rolls of 8mm film, 
viewing film for purpose of obtaining crime evidence 
was additional search requiring warrant or consent); 
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 
L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) (analysis of contents of fingernails 
was search requiring constitutional protection 
distinguishing fingerprints and voice samples 
constantly exposed to public). The constitutional 
violation required suppression of J.W.K.'s blood tests 
and his resulting confession. See Schweich, 414 
N.W.2d at 230-31 (suppressing evidence obtained 
from illegal search and evidence that was fruit of 
illegal search). 
DECISION 
The district court properly suppressed evidence 
obtained by comparing J.W.K.'s blood to evidence at 
the residential crime scene because that search 
exceeded the scope of J.W.K.'s consent. 
Affirmed. 
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